Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 103 | Issue 1

Article 6

Winter 2013

When Innocent Defendants Falsely Confess:
Analyzing the Ramifications of Entering Alford
Pleas in the Context of the Burgeoning Innocence
Movement
Sydney Schneider

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Sydney Schneider, When Innocent Defendants Falsely Confess: Analyzing the Ramifications of Entering Alford Pleas in the Context of the
Burgeoning Innocence Movement, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 279 (2013).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol103/iss1/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

0091-4169/13/10301-0279
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright © 2013 by Northwestern University School of Law

Vol. 103, No. 1
Printed in U.S.A.

COMMENTS
WHEN INNOCENT DEFENDANTS FALSELY
CONFESS: ANALYZING THE
RAMIFICATIONS OF ENTERING ALFORD
PLEAS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
BURGEONING INNOCENCE MOVEMENT
Sydney Schneider*
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 19, 2011, Damien Echols left death row and faced the
world for the first time in seventeen years.1 Dubbed the “West Memphis
Three,” Echols, Jessie Misskelley, and Jason Baldwin were convicted of the
brutal murders of three children in West Memphis in 1994 based on
Misskelley’s confession.2 They were released from prison after serving
seventeen years pursuant to plea agreements reached with prosecutors: the
three defendants entered “Alford pleas,” in which they maintained their
innocence but agreed that prosecutors had enough evidence to convict.3
In Virginia, meanwhile, twenty-seven-year-old Robert Davis has been
*
J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2013; B.A., Washington
University in St. Louis, 2008. I would like to thank Professors Steven Drizin and Josh
Tepfer of Northwestern Law’s Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth for their assistance
in developing the idea for this Comment. Special thanks to Professor Laura Nirider of the
Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth for her invaluable suggestions and edits. I would
also like to thank the editorial staff of JCLC for their assistance. I owe immense gratitude to
my family and friends for their constant love and support. Thanks in particular to Dave and
Seth—I love you guys.
1
See 48 Hours: West Memphis 3: Free (CBS television broadcast Sept. 17, 2011),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7381432n [hereinafter West
Memphis 3].
2
Id.
3
See ‘West Memphis Three’ Plea Deal? Men Controversially Convicted of Killing Boy
Scouts Might Be Released, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 19, 2011, 9:43 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/19/west-memphis-three-plea-deal_n_931171.html.
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sitting in a prison cell for the past eight years. Charged with arson and the
murder of a woman and her son, Davis entered an Alford plea in 2004.4 He
was sentenced to twenty-three years in prison.5 Davis and his attorney
maintain that his confession back in 2003 was coerced and Davis never
committed these crimes.6 Because Virginia bars defendants who enter
Alford pleas from seeking postconviction relief, Davis’s only hope for
release rests in the hands of Virginia Governor Robert F. McDonnell, who
has the power to grant executive clemency.7
While the defendants in these cases currently find themselves in very
different predicaments, these two cases share one common theme: both
feature defendants who were charged with murder and falsely confessed.
Thus, each case serves as an excellent lens through which to view the issues
surrounding Alford pleas in today’s justice system. Specifically, this
Comment will analyze the use of Alford pleas in cases where the only
substantial piece of evidence linking the defendant to a crime is a
confession.
The advent of plea bargaining in the legal system in the past century
has rendered the classic “trial” virtually obsolete. From 1976 through 2002,
in terms of percentage of dispositions, state court criminal trials declined
from 8.5% to 3.3%, bench trials as a percentage of dispositions fell from
5.0% to 2.0%, and jury trials declined from 3.4% to 1.3%.8 While the
guilty plea “represent[s] the largest share of adjudicated cases in . . . federal
criminal justice” (95.2%),9 the Alford plea has evolved to encompass a
small share of adjudicated cases in the United States.10 This plea
arrangement derives from North Carolina v. Alford, in which the United
States Supreme Court held that guilty pleas by defendants who maintain
their innocence do not violate due process.11
Numerous scholarly articles have been written about Alford pleas,
addressing their constitutionality, their place in relation to the traditional
4
See Lisa Provence, Case Not Closed: Special Prosecutor Named in Crozet Murders,
THE HOOK (July 9, 2011, 2:31 PM), http://www.readthehook.com/98888/clemency-petitionspecial-prosecutor-named-davis-case.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Davis’s clemency petition is pending as of the writing of this Comment.
8
ROBERT BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 86 (2009).
9
Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 90 (2005).
10
Allison D. Redlich & Asil Ali Özdoğru, Alford Pleas in the Age of Innocence, 27
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 467, 474 (2009).
11
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970). I will discuss this case in great
detail in Part II of this Comment.
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justifications for punishment, and their perceived accuracy.12 This
Comment will focus specifically on the practical aspects of the Alford plea.
It will provide insight into the circumstances in which attorneys should not
recommend that their clients utilize the plea.
Part II of this Comment provides the history of the Alford plea and the
recent scholarship and case law surrounding false confessions. Part III
discusses the factors leading to false confessions. It also looks at the advent
of the Innocence Movement, which has been characterized by growing
numbers of exonerations of defendants who have falsely confessed. Part IV
analyzes the two aforementioned case studies—Echols and Davis. Through
the analysis of these cases, it argues that given the strength of the Innocence
Movement, innocent defendants should not enter Alford pleas in cases
where the sole piece of evidence is a confession. Part V summarizes major
points and provides an overall conclusion to the Comment.
II. BACKGROUND: THE ALFORD PLEA
A. NORTH CAROLINA V. ALFORD
The Alford plea received its name from the 1970 Supreme Court case
North Carolina v. Alford.13 Henry Alford was indicted for first-degree
murder on December 2, 1963.14 Throughout his trial preparations, Alford’s
attorney interviewed several witnesses who led him to believe Alford was
guilty and that he would probably be convicted at trial.15 While there were
no eyewitnesses to the actual murder, there were witnesses who swore
under oath that Alford had taken his gun from his house and stated that he
was going to kill the victim.16 These witnesses said that Alford told them
that he had killed the victim.17 Although Alford maintained his innocence,
faced with these witness statements and no evidentiary support for his
innocence claim, Alford’s attorney recommended that he plead guilty to a

12
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The
Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412 (2003) (critiquing Bibas’s
rejection of Alford pleas and his stance on plea bargaining in general); Stephanos Bibas,
Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of
Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361 (2003); Jenny Elayne Ronis,
Comment, The Pragmatic Plea: Expanding Use of the Alford Plea to Promote Traditionally
Conflicting Interests of the Criminal Justice System, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1389 (2010).
13
400 U.S. 25 (1970).
14
Id. at 26–27.
15
Id. at 27.
16
Id. at 28.
17
Id.
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lesser charge of second-degree murder.18 Alford pleaded guilty to seconddegree murder but stated to the court that he was in fact innocent and that
he was pleading guilty only to avoid the death penalty.19 The judge
sentenced him to the maximum sentence for second-degree murder—thirty
years in prison—and Alford appealed on the constitutional ground that his
plea was “the product of fear and coercion” and in violation of his
constitutional rights.20
In 1965, the state court found that the plea was entered into “willingly,
knowingly and understandingly” and “made on the advice of competent
counsel and in the face of a strong prosecution case.”21 Alford petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus, first in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina,22 which denied the writ based on its
findings that Alford had “voluntarily and knowingly agreed to plead
guilty,” and then in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.23 A
divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that his plea was
involuntary because it was motivated by fear of the death sentence.24
The Supreme Court held that there are no constitutional barriers in
place to prevent a judge from accepting a guilty plea from a defendant who
wants to plead guilty while still protesting his innocence.25 The Court
stated, “An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and
understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is
unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the
crime.”26 The Court also held that a judge can accept the plea only if
“strong evidence of actual guilt” exists.27 The Court also noted that the
defendant in this case was represented and advised by competent counsel
and that there was substantial evidence that tended to demonstrate guilt;28
thus, the defendant “intelligently” concluded that it would be to his
advantage to plead guilty in order to avoid the death penalty.29
It is also important to note that in its holding, the Court did not give all
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 29–30.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 31, 37.
Id. at 37.
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defendants a legal right to enter Alford pleas; rather, the Court left it to
individual states and judges to decide whether they want to accept Alford
pleas.30 The Court stated:
A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under the Constitution to have
his guilty plea accepted by the court . . . although the States may by statute or
otherwise confer such a right. Likewise, the States may bar their courts from
accepting guilty pleas from any defendants who assert their innocence . . . which gives
a trial judge discretion to “refuse to accept a plea of guilty . . . .” We need not now
31
delineate the scope of that discretion.

Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, dissented,
focusing on the death penalty aspect of the case. He stated that Alford’s
guilty plea was not made voluntarily because he was “so gripped by fear of
the death penalty.”32
B. THE ALFORD PLEA ACROSS THE STATES
The Alford opinion explicitly noted that judges have the right to accept
this plea, just as they have discretion to accept guilty pleas under Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.33 Currently forty-seven states and
the District of Columbia accept Alford pleas.34 Defendants in Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Ohio frequently use the Alford
plea.35 But courts in Indiana, Michigan, and New Jersey have rejected the
plea.36 Even in states that have explicitly accepted Alford pleas, judges still
maintain discretion to reject the plea.37 For example, states such as North
Carolina, Washington, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin construed Alford pleas

30

See Curtis J. Shipley, Note, The Alford Plea: A Necessary but Unpredictable Tool for
the Criminal Defendant, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1063, 1063 (1987).
31
Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n.11 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S.
705, 719 (1962)).
32
Id. at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33
Id. at 38 n.11.
34
See Bibas, supra note 12, at n.52.
35
Id. at 1377. Bibas conducted a series of Westlaw searches to determine the number of
cases involving Alford pleas.
36
See, e.g., Ross v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. 1983) (holding, “as a matter of law,
that a judge may not accept a plea of guilty when the defendant both pleads guilty and
maintains his innocence at the same time,” and suggesting that Alford pleas offend public
policy); People v. Butler, 204 N.W.2d 325, 330 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (stating courts must
look to the “ultimate guilt or innocence of the pleaders” when accepting a guilty plea); State
v. Korzenowski, 303 A.2d 596, 597 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973) (citing with
approval a New Jersey Supreme Court directive providing that “notwithstanding the recent
decision in North Carolina v. Alford . . . , except in capital cases, a plea shall not be accepted
from a defendant who does not admit commission of the offense”).
37
See Shipley, supra note 30, at 1063.
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very narrowly.38
Federal courts have consistently discouraged Alford pleas,39 and
federal prosecutors are reluctant to encourage Alford pleas because the
policy of the U.S Department of Justice discourages them.40 In its
sentencing instructions, the Justice Department observes that the public
may not approve of prosecutors pushing a defendant who claims innocence
to plead guilty.41 This discouragement is reflected in statistics showing that
state defendants utilize the Alford plea much more frequently than federal
defendants.42
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF DEFENDANTS WHO ENTER ALFORD
PLEAS
In general, defendants use Alford pleas much less frequently than
traditional guilty or not-guilty pleas.43 A 1997 survey of inmates in state
and federal correctional facilities found that approximately 3% of inmates
had entered Alford pleas.44 When looking only at inmates in state facilities,
the percentage was significantly higher (6.5%).45
In 2002, Professor Stephen Bibas conducted a Westlaw search for
cases involving this plea.46 He found 2,500 cases that involved Alford
pleas; 27% of these cases involved sex offenses, 27% involved other violent
offenses, and 12% involved white-collar offenses.47
From 2003 through May 2004, the Department of Justice conducted a
38
Ronis, supra note 12, at 1400 (“North Carolina interprets the Alford plea to be a
species of nolo contendere, in which the defendant makes no admission of guilt at
sentencing. Wisconsin finds that the assertion of an Alford plea is relevant only during
sentencing, becoming indistinguishable from a guilty plea in later proceedings. In Rhode
Island, trial judges are permitted discretion to accept the plea, which results in criminal
conviction and may be used later as a distinct sentencing factor, or to estop relitigation of the
criminal case in collateral proceedings. Washington only accepts the plea for certain
crimes—for example, Seattle bans the plea’s application in sexual assault cases except in
extraordinary circumstances.” (citations omitted)).
39
Id. at 1399.
40
Bibas, supra note 12, at 1380 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
PROSECUTION (1980), as excerpted in 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 317, 328–29 (1994)).
41
Id.
42
See Redlich & Özdoğru, supra note 10, at 469.
43
See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
NCJ 179023, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1, 8 tbl.17 (Nov. 2000), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
See Bibas, supra note 12, at 1376.
47
Id.
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survey of inmates in state correctional facilities.48 Researchers sampled
16,152 state inmates; the U.S. Census Bureau interviewed inmates in
person.49 This study found that 949 of these inmates, or 6.5%, had entered
Alford pleas.50 Within the three types of guilty pleas (guilty, Alford, and
nolo contendere), Alford pleas accounted for 8.5%.51 This percentage was
essentially identical to the percentage of state inmates who had entered
Alford pleas in 1997.52 With this data, two researchers estimated
population rates and concluded that approximately 76,000 individuals in
state prison in 2004 entered Alford pleas.53 This data also showed that
approximately 50% of inmates who had used Alford pleas were
incarcerated for violent crimes, such as murder, sexual offense, and assault;
about 25% were incarcerated for property crime; 20% were incarcerated for
drug-related crimes; and 4% were incarcerated for public-order crimes.54
The breakdown is important because it shows that defendants who are
charged with more serious offenses, and therefore are facing more prison
time, use Alford pleas at a much higher rate than the average defendant.
Violent crimes yield lengthier sentences; thus, it is logical to think that
defendants who are faced with the threat of longer sentences might be more
apt to plea bargain. It is also possible that defendants who are charged with
serious—and oftentimes more heinous crimes—would want to proclaim
innocence to the court by entering an Alford plea, rather than admit guilt as
required by a standard guilty plea.
Moreover, the 2004 Department of Justice study cited above
specifically analyzed the pleas of inmates who were convicted of murder.55
Of these inmates, 8.5% entered Alford pleas (two percentage points higher
than the total inmate population).56 In the study, out of those convicted of
murder who entered Alford pleas, 17.6% were released before trial, 20.9%
received life sentences, and none were sentenced to death.57 In contrast,
12% of those convicted of murder who pleaded guilty were released before
trial, 24.9% received life sentences, and 0.40% were sentenced to death.58
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

See Redlich & Özdoğru, supra note 10, at 474.
Id.
Id. at 475.
Id. at 476.
Id.
Id. at 484.
Id.
Id. at 473–74.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 477.
Id.
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For those who pleaded not guilty, 13.9% were released before trial, 45.7%
received life sentences, and 3.2% were sentenced to death.59
As illustrated in the seminal case of North Carolina v. Alford, the
Alford plea provides an avenue by which defendants can avoid the death
sentence;60 clearly, some defendants choose this route rather than risking
entering a plea of “not guilty” and facing harsher sentences and possibly
death.
III. THE PHENOMENON OF FALSE CONFESSIONS AND THE ADVENT OF THE
INNOCENCE MOVEMENT
It is clear why attorneys whose clients have confessed would seek a
plea bargain: most people cannot understand why someone would confess
to a crime that he did not commit. The United States Supreme Court has
recognized the power of confessions as evidence of guilt.61 And
psychologists have also commented on the persuasive power of
confessions. For example, in one study, researchers presented mock jurors
with various types of evidence: circumstantial evidence, eyewitness
testimony, and testimony that the accused had confessed to the crime.62
The study found that jurors who heard the confession evidence were
significantly more likely to find the defendant guilty than jurors who heard
the other types of evidence.63
Because confessions are so powerful in the minds of triers of fact, it is
no wonder that innocent defendants—and their attorneys—may jump at the
chance to enter Alford pleas in exchange for a reduced sentence when the
defendants have falsely confessed. However, attorneys who represent
defendants who have falsely confessed must understand the phenomenon of
false confessions when they consider their plea-bargaining options. The
two cases studies presented in this Comment illustrate the problem with
false confessions. Both cases concern teenagers whose convictions were
based in large part on confessions without any corroborating physical
evidence.
Why would someone confess to a crime that he did not commit? It
59

Id.
See 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970).
61
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966) (characterizing a confession
as “the most compelling possible evidence of guilt” (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1884) (recognizing that a “voluntary
confession of guilt is among the most effectual proofs in the law”).
62
Gerald R. Miller & F. Joseph Boster, Three Images of the Trial: Their Implications for
Psychological Research, in PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 19, 20–21 (Bruce Dennis
Sales ed., 1977).
63
Id.
60
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seems illogical that someone would utter words of guilt when he is in fact
innocent. However, false confessions are an all-too-common reality in
today’s criminal justice system. Recent studies indicate that false
confessions play a role in anywhere from 14% to 25% of wrongful
convictions.64
In general, false confessions arise from specific police interrogation
tactics.65 False confessions generally occur as a result of a police
interrogator’s use of common and well-intended—but pressure-filled and
psychologically coercive—interrogation techniques.66 In the United States,
the Reid Technique is the most widely implemented police interrogation
training tool;67 in fact, “over 300,000 professionals in law enforcement have
been trained to use the Reid Technique over the previous three
decades . . . .”68 This technique instructs the police “to use coercive and
deceptive techniques to obtain a confession,” such as “presenting false
evidence, preventing the suspect from speaking unless he/she is making a
confession, tricking the suspect into a confession by offering an
understanding and sympathetic attitude, and minimizing the moral
seriousness of the crime.”69 These tactics have not only led to guilty
defendants confessing, but also have been far too effective in eliciting
confessions from innocent defendants. For example, scholars have
uncovered at least 250 interrogation-induced false confessions over the last
thirty years, and there are likely many more individuals yet unknown who
have falsely confessed.70 In a 2007 survey, law enforcement officers
estimated that about 10% of all interrogations result in false confessions.71
The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized that sophisticated police
interrogation techniques can produce false confessions. In 2009, the Court
found that “there is mounting empirical evidence that these pressures
[associated with custodial police interrogation] can induce a frighteningly
high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed.”72
64

Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the PostDNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 902 (2004).
65
Id. at 908–09.
66
See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 6 (2010).
67
Jessica R. Meyer & N. Dickon Reppucci, Police Practices and Perceptions Regarding
Juvenile Interrogation and Interrogative Suggestibility, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 757, 760
(2007).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 760–61.
70
See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 243–45 (2008).
71
Meyer & Reppucci, supra note 67, at 770.
72
Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 320–21 (2009) (citing Drizin & Leo, supra note
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It is safe to assume that the Reid Technique, which is designed to wear
down and encourage adults to confess, is even more effective on young,
inexperienced, and highly susceptible defendants such as the ones featured
in this Comment—especially given the fact that children and adolescents
“have significant neurological deficiencies [compared to adults] that result
in stark limitations of judgment.”73 Data on false confessions support the
idea that young people falsely confess at a much higher rate than adults. In
2004, leading experts on juvenile false confession, Steven A. Drizin and
Richard A. Leo, examined 125 proven false confessions taken between
1971 and 2002.74 They analyzed their sample by age and found that young
people were significantly overrepresented: 63% of people sampled were
under the age of twenty-five at the time of their confessions.75 Another
study analyzed the rate of false confessions by age, examining the
percentage of exonerees who had falsely confessed.76 As a general matter,
the study found that youth are far more likely to falsely confess than adults,
and that younger children are more likely to falsely confess than older
children.77
The movement concerning acknowledgement of the relationship
between false confessions and actual innocence has gained traction over the
last decade.78 The “Innocence Movement,” which came to the foreground
in the 1980s and 1990s with the advent of DNA testing and exonerations
and took hold in the 2000s, “has generally focused on one question: How
can we maximize the chances of getting the ‘right guy,’ that is, of
convicting the guilty while acquitting the innocent?”79 The Innocence
Movement has been characterized by an increase in the number of
innocence projects, the average number of annual DNA exonerations,80
64, at 906–07).
73
See JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., AM. BAR ASS’N, ADOLESCENCE, BRAIN DEVELOPMENT AND
LEGAL CULPABILITY 3 (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_juvjus_Adolescence.authcheck
dam.pdf.
74
See Drizin & Leo, supra note 64, at 932.
75
Id. at 945.
76
Joshua A. Tepfer et al., Arresting Development: Convictions of Innocent Youth, 62
RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 904–05 (2010).
77
Id.
78
See Marvin Zalman, An Integrated Justice Model of Wrongful Convictions, 74 ALB. L.
REV. 1465, 1484 (2010–2011).
79
See Andrew E. Taslitz, Sentencing Lessons from the Innocence Movement, 21 CRIM.
JUST. 6, 6 (2006).
80
Zalman, supra note 78, at 1499 (explaining that the average number of annual DNA
exonerations “grew from 6 per year between 1989 and 1999, to 18.1 per year from 2000 to
2009”).
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scholarship relating to the field, and media and pop culture featuring more
stories about wrongfully convicted defendants.81 And with the advent of
DNA testing has come the understanding that people do falsely confess at
alarmingly high rates. In fact, the Innocence Project found that false
confessions have figured into 27% of the approximately 301 convictions
reversed by DNA evidence.82
Acknowledging the unique role that false confessions—particularly
those given by young people—play in the overall phenomenon of wrongful
convictions, Northwestern University School of Law launched a separate
clinic to represent and advocate for wrongfully convicted youth.83 In 2011
alone, the Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth, in conjunction with
its partners at the Innocence Movement and the Exoneration Project, as well
as several private attorneys, played a role in two monumental cases. Five
men, dubbed the “Dixmoor 5,” were exonerated after DNA linked other
men to the crime.84 Based on false confessions, these men were convicted
of rape and murder when they were teenagers and served nearly two
decades in prison.85 Two weeks after the Dixmoor 5 convictions were
vacated, an Illinois judge vacated the convictions of four defendants, known
as the “Englewood 4,” who had also falsely confessed to a rape and murder
when they were juveniles in 1994; recent DNA testing linked the rape and
murder to a previously convicted rapist and murderer.86 In fact, from
November 2011 to January 2012, Northwestern Law’s renowned Center on
Wrongful Convictions and its sister project, the Center on Wrongful
Convictions of Youth, played a role in eleven exonerations—the single
largest collection of exonerations in any three-month period in the history
of the Innocence Movement.87 The majority of these cases featured false

81

Id. at 1491.
Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.php
(last visited Nov. 9, 2012).
83
Steve Drizin, Why Young People Falsely Confess to Police, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 2,
2009, 11:23 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-drizin/why-young-people-falsely_b
_307236.html.
84
See NORTHWESTERN LAW: CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS OF YOUTH,
http://www.cwcy.org/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2012).
85
See Sophia Tareen, Convictions Vacated Against 3 in 1991 Dixmoor Rape, Murder,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 3, 2011, 6:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/03/
convictions-vacated-again_0_n_1074763.html.
86
See Steve Mills, DNA Upends 4 Convictions, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 2011, § 1, at 4.
87
News and Events: Center on Wrongful Convictions Celebrates a Banner Year,
NORTHWESTERN LAW (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/news/newsdisplay.
cfm?ID=565.
82
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confessions.88
As the Innocence Movement gains traction, media outlets across the
country are spreading the idea of false confessions to the general
population.89 The increase in press on the subject has presumably informed
the public that people do in fact falsely confess and, thus, potential jurors
are likely to be better informed about the issue. While confessions will
undoubtedly still hold weight in the eyes of juries, the Innocence Movement
has spread awareness and knowledge of the unreliability of confessions
lacking any corroborating physical evidence.
IV. DISCUSSION
This Part presents the facts of the cases of the “West Memphis Three”
and Robert Davis. It outlines the background of each case and the events
that led up to the defendants entering Alford pleas. It then analyzes the
ways in which the Alford plea has affected each defendant, focusing
primarily on postconviction remedies and other ramifications for an
innocent defendant who has essentially pleaded guilty.
It concludes that Alford pleas should not be used in cases where a
confession is the primary piece of evidence linking the defendant to the
alleged crime. The advent of the Innocence Movement has shed light on
the unreliability of confessions that lack corroborating physical evidence.
Given the changing perceptions of false confessions within the mainstream
media and the general population, it is in the best interest of these
defendants to plead “not guilty” and preserve their postconviction options
in the event that they are convicted.
A. THE WEST MEMPHIS THREE
On May 6, 1993, the bodies of eight-year-olds Steven Branch, Michael
Moore, and Christopher Byers were found submerged in a creek in a strip

88

Id.
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of woods next to a highway in an area of West Memphis, Arkansas, known
as “Robin Hood Hills.”90 The boys had been reported missing the night
before around 8:00 p.m. by Byers’s adoptive father, John Mark Byers.91
The bodies were found nude, their hands and feet had been hog-tied with
their own shoelaces, and it was evident that they had been beaten and
mutilated.92 The cause of death was ruled as drowning. 93 With no other
leads, the police began to explore the theory that the murders were a result
of satanic cult activity.94 This led them to focus their attention on Damien
Echols, an eighteen-year-old high school dropout, who wore a lot of black
and was rumored to engage in satanic rituals.95
A witness named Vicki Hutcherson, the mother of a young boy,
Aaron, who had claimed to witness the murders, led the police to the door
of seventeen-year-old Jessie Misskelley.96 Aaron’s statements were clearly
unreliable, as he told various versions of his story that featured many
inconsistencies.97 Misskelley had a very low IQ, and his mental state and
age made him extremely susceptible to police interrogation techniques.98
Over the course of several hours (transcripts of the interrogation are
unavailable, although transcripts of the confessions themselves are
available), Misskelley confessed to seeing Damien Echols and his friend,
Jason Baldwin, rape and kill the three boys.99 However, Misskelley’s
confession featured many characteristics that experts have identified as
indicative of a false confession. For one thing, Misskelley got many of the
facts of the crime wrong.100 For instance, Jessie claimed that he, Damien,
and Jason had picked up the boys and killed them around noon;101 however,
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witnesses proved that the boys were in school all day and the murder did
not occur until that evening. He also told police that the three teenagers
used rope to hog-tie the boys; however, shoelaces were used.102
Jessie Misskelley refused to testify against Jason Baldwin and Damien
Echols, so prosecutors could not use Misskelley’s confession at Baldwin
and Echols’s joint trial.103 Defense attorneys later learned that one juror had
actually read about Misskelley’s confession and told the other jury
members during deliberations.104 Echols and Baldwin were both found
guilty of first-degree murder.105 Baldwin was sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole and Echols received the death sentence.106
During the investigation and trial, HBO began filming a documentary
about the murders that came to be titled Paradise Lost.107 This
documentary galvanized supporters of the West Memphis Three into action.
Experienced appellate attorneys were brought into the case.108 The three
defendants petitioned for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered
evidence, including DNA-testing results that excluded Misskelley, Baldwin,
and Echols as donors of genetic material recovered from the crime scene.109
Lower court judges repeatedly denied these petitions.110 Finally, in
November 2010, more than fifteen years after their convictions, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas granted the petitioners’ request for an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether a new trial was in order; the
hearing was to take place in October 2011.111 However, it was clear that
there was a great deal of delay built into this process and the West Memphis
Three would have to languish for years in prison while they awaited the
outcome of the hearing and a possible new trial.
In a surprising move, defense attorney Steven Braga contacted the
State and made an intriguing proposal: the defendants would enter an
102
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Alford plea; in exchange, all three would be released from prison.112 The
State agreed to the deal.113
The decision to accept the deal was not an easy one for the West
Memphis Three, and particularly for Jason Baldwin, who wanted to fight
for his innocence and seek a full exoneration.114 Damien Echols, on the
other hand, had been in solitary confinement for most of his prison stay on
death row; his emotional and physical health were waning.115 Therefore, he
readily accepted the agreement as a means to get out of prison as quickly as
possible.116 Understanding the toll that his stay on death row was having on
Echols, Baldwin reluctantly agreed to the deal.117 On August 19, 2011, the
three men were freed.118
B. ROBERT DAVIS
On February 19, 2003, around 8:40 a.m., a neighbor saw smoke
coming from Nola Charles’s house on Cling Lane in Crozet, Virginia, a
small suburban town located near Charlottesville.119 Upon entering the
house, firefighters found the charred body of Nola Charles tied to the
bottom of a bunk bed.120 In the upstairs bedroom, they found her threeyear-old son lying dead on the floor.121 The medical examiner later found
that Nola Charles had been stabbed prior to the fire and that she died from
multiple stab wounds and blunt force trauma to her skull.122 Charles’s son,
Thomas, died from asphyxiation caused by smoke inhalation.123
The subsequent murder investigation led police to nineteen-year-old
Rocky Fugett and his sister, fifteen-year-old Jessica Fugett, who lived
across the street from the Charles house.124 They ultimately confessed and
112
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falsely implicated seventeen-year-old Tygue Herrmann and eighteen-yearold Robert Davis, who lived on the same street as the Fugetts and Nola
Charles.125
Davis was arrested just after midnight, on February 22, 2003,
following the interrogations of Rocky and Jessica Fugett three days
earlier.126 Davis’s confession is one of the most egregious examples of a
false confession, specifically because of the coercive tactics used by police,
the contamination of facts, and Davis’s repeated denials and statements of
inaccurate facts.127 Davis’s confession featured classic signs associated
with false confessions: Robert Davis asserted his innocence seventy-eight
times during the six-hour interrogation during which police officers
threatened the death penalty if he did not confess, implied leniency if he did
confess, fed him key facts of the crime, and made Robert feel entirely
hopeless.128 Moreover, nationally recognized experts on false confessions
and police interrogation tactics, including Joseph Buckley of Reid &
Associates, have deemed the confession suspect.129
Rocky Fugett decided that he would not testify against Jessica or Davis
and entered a guilty plea to two counts of first-degree murder.130 In
November 2005, he was sentenced to seventy-five years in prison.131 His
sister Jessica was initially found incompetent to stand trial but was restored
to competency.132 Jessica went to trial and was found guilty of two counts
of first-degree murder, arson, and breaking and entering.133
Prosecutors approached Robert Davis’s defense attorneys with a plea
agreement that stated that the Commonwealth would drop all of the
remaining charges if Davis would agree to plead guilty to one first-degree
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murder charge of killing Nola Charles and one second-degree murder
charge of killing Thomas Charles.134 Davis accepted the agreement and on
April 19, 2004, he entered an Alford plea to the two murder charges.135 The
Court imposed a twenty-three-year sentence.136
Rocky Fugett currently resides at Sussex II State Prison. He has
signed an affidavit stating that Davis was never involved in the crime,
recanting his initial statements to the police.137
C. RAMIFICATIONS OF ALFORD PLEAS FOR THE WEST MEMPHIS
THREE AND ROBERT DAVIS
These two cases present powerful and thought-provoking scenarios in
which defendants and attorneys must weigh various factors when deciding
if they should enter Alford pleas. The defendants and their attorneys had to
balance the practical benefits of Alford pleas—freedom in the case of the
West Memphis Three and a reduced sentence in the case of Robert Davis—
against the legal ramifications of essentially pleading guilty to crimes that
they did not commit.
While each defendant made the choice that he felt best served his
immediate needs at the time of the plea, it is important that innocent
defendants and their attorneys understand the harsh ramifications of Alford
pleas as they pertain to postconviction remedies or hopes of proving “actual
innocence.” This Part outlines the considerations that attorneys and
defendants make when deciding whether to enter into an Alford plea. After
analyzing the potential benefits and negative consequences of using the
plea, Part IV argues that, given the recent success of the Innocence
Movement in spreading awareness about the phenomenon of false
confessions, a defendant should not enter an Alford plea if the State’s case
against him rests on a confession lacking any corroborating evidence, such
as was the case with Robert Davis and the West Memphis Three.
1. Potential Benefits for Defendants Who Enter Alford Pleas
Before outlining the specific negative consequences an Alford plea can
have on defendants, it is important to address the possible benefits that
could make this plea appealing. While I argue that defendants should not
enter Alford pleas in cases featuring false confessions, it is important to
examine why defendants might feel compelled to do so.
134
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Reduced Sentence

The possibility of a reduced sentence makes the Alford plea attractive
to defendants like Robert Davis. As discussed in Part II of this Comment,
defendants who are charged with murder and plead guilty or enter an Alford
plea tend to receive reduced sentences and avoid the death penalty as
compared to those who plead not guilty.138 Innocent defendants and their
attorneys must weigh the promise of a reduced sentence via plea bargaining
against the risks associated with pleading “not guilty” and leaving their
fates in the hands of a judge or jury. As previously discussed, courts and
psychologists have found that jurors have historically placed extraordinary
weight on a confession as evidence of guilt.139
Davis’s sentence, compared to the sentences of the two other
codefendants who faced similar charges, is illustrative. Jessica Fugett
pleaded not guilty and went to trial where she was found guilty of two
counts of first-degree murder; she was sentenced to 100 years in prison.140
Rocky Fugett entered a guilty plea to two counts of first-degree murder; he
was sentenced to seventy-five years in prison.141 Davis, who was initially
charged with the same crimes as Rocky and Jessica, entered an Alford plea;
by the terms of that plea, he was sentenced to only twenty-three years in
prison.142 Clearly, Davis’s Alford plea allowed him to escape a harsher
sentence.
Multiple circumstances surrounding this case could have contributed
to Davis receiving a much lower sentence, even though he was initially
charged with the same crimes as the Fugetts. For example, prosecutors may
have understood that their case rested solely on Davis’s confession, which
contained factual inaccuracies, and which one expert deemed unreliable.143
Thus, they could have been looking for a way to ensure that Davis was
convicted without risking a trial. In contrast, Jessica led police to evidence
that corroborated her confession; for example, she directed officers to the
hiding spot of an iron pipe, which was consistent with Nola Charles’s
injuries.144 The plea agreement stated that Davis’s original sentence of
eighty years had been reduced by fifty-seven years when he entered his
Alford plea, as the plea agreement stipulated that the Commonwealth would
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nol-pros every charge except the two counts of murder.145 If Davis had
pleaded not guilty and been convicted, the prosecution may have asked for
eighty years during the sentencing phase of the trial.
Davis’s case presents an interesting conundrum, particularly for
innocent defendants who have falsely confessed. Davis quickly recanted
his confession, and his attorney even tried and failed to suppress the
confession before trial.146 Thus, Davis and his attorney were faced with a
situation in which—if the case had gone to trial—the fact finder would have
heard Davis’s own admission of guilt. Even with no physical evidence
linking Davis to the crime, confessions are extremely persuasive. Having
entered his Alford plea, Davis will be out of prison by the time he is fortyone years old. While an innocent defendant spending any time in prison is
an extreme miscarriage of justice, Davis will still have half of his life in
front of him. Had he gone to trial, pleaded “not guilty,” and been
convicted, he could have faced the prospect of spending his entire life in a
jail cell. Thus, it is not shocking that Davis and his attorney decided to take
the plea deal. However, as previously discussed, much has changed
between 2003, when this case was tried, and 2012. The Innocence
Movement has gained traction, exonerations are happening at a record pace,
and the mainstream media has alerted citizens to the phenomenon of false
confessions.147 Given the advent of the Innocence Movement, a plea of
“not guilty” may not pose the same risk today as it did for Davis and his
attorney.
ii. Attorney–Client Relationship and Legal Strategy
The Alford plea also allows a defendant to garner the practical benefits
of a plea bargain without putting his lawyer in the difficult position of
asking an innocent client to lie about being guilty.
Because the defendants in these cases were not only innocent but also
susceptible teenagers at the time of their arrests, they may have placed even
more weight on having their attorneys “on their side.” Trust in the
attorney–client relationship is of the utmost importance.148 Courts have
145
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recognized the importance of trust in the attorney–client relationship,
especially in criminal cases.149 For example, the Ninth Circuit stated:
It is unlikely that a criminal defendant will have a legal education. He, therefore, will
have to rely on his attorney’s advice for the most basic decisions in a criminal trial—
whether to plead guilty, whether to testify, whether to present a defense, and which
witnesses to call. If the defendant does not trust his attorney, he may be unwilling to
150
follow his attorney’s advice in these important areas.

It is clear that the attorney–client relationship played an important role
in Jessie Misskelley’s case, for example.151 Over the course of the
investigation into the boys’ murders and even after trial, police tried
numerous techniques to elicit statements from Misskelley and to persuade
him to testify against the other defendants.152 They would “transport” him
without his attorney’s knowledge and, during the car ride, question him in
an attempt to elicit inculpatory statements.153 Dan Stidham, Misskelley’s
attorney, stated that police were able to obtain a second confession from
Misskelley by visiting him without Stidham’s knowledge or consent and
that this action represented “a conscious, calculated and ongoing attempt by
the Prosecution to interfere with the attorney/client relationship between
Jessie Lloyd Misskelley, Jr. and his Court appointed attorneys.”154 At one
point, after prosecutors had repeatedly visited Misskelley and tried to
persuade him to testify, Misskelley stood up in a conference room and
announced that he wished to make a statement in spite of the advice and
counsel of his attorney.155 He then exited the conference room and refused

if they are to be successful in the subsequent representation.”).
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to talk with his attorneys.156
Clearly, Misskelley was an uninformed, scared defendant who
struggled to understand that his attorney was looking out for his best
interests. His tumultuous relationship with his attorney had a real impact on
the criminal investigation and the trial.
The relationship between Robert Davis and his attorney also
exemplifies the importance of trust in the relationship between a defendant
and his attorney. Although Davis confessed, he immediately told his
attorney that the confession was a lie.157 If Davis’s attorney had questioned
his client’s innocence by demanding that he admit guilt, it could have
seriously undermined their relationship. For example, if Davis felt that his
attorney presumed his guilt, Davis may not have been willing to open up
and candidly share information with his attorney. Such information could
have included important details about his confession, his relationship with
his codefendants, or his overall state of mind throughout the legal process.
Thus, the Alford plea allowed Davis’s attorney to reach a plea deal that
resulted in a reduced sentence for his client. It also allowed the attorney to
convey to his client that he believed in his innocence.
Alford pleas also help stem any potential ethical dilemmas that
attorneys might face if they advise their clients to lie about their innocence
in court. Before Alford, many attorneys believed it unethical to permit
clients to plead guilty when these clients told their lawyers they were
innocent.158 Moreover, the Alford plea permits defendants to assert their
innocence freely rather than admitting guilt solely to obtain a plea
agreement. Therefore, attorneys are in a better position to determine the
appropriate legal strategy of the case. This “full disclosure” assures that
clients will not have to lie and leave room for the attorney to face
unexpected surprises at trial.159 Moreover, if a defendant is able to maintain
his innocence, his attorney is in a better position to consider strategically
the long-term ramifications of accepting a plea agreement. An attorney
with an innocent client might have different considerations in mind than an
attorney with a guilty client; specifically, attorneys with innocent clients
will have to understand the postconviction ramifications of entering an
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Alford plea.
2. Negative Consequences of Entering an Alford Plea
i.

Limits on Direct Appeal

Even before defendants attempt to pursue postconviction remedies,
entering Alford pleas may impede defendants’ access to direct appellate
review of their sentences. The Supreme Court has held that defendants can
enter into a plea bargain in which they waive their right to appeal.160
Consistent with this principle, the courts of appeal have upheld the general
validity of a sentencing-appeal waiver in a plea agreement.161
Robert Davis did not have a waiver stipulation in his plea
agreement.162 However, Virginia courts have held that, generally, by
entering a plea of guilty, an accused waives the right to appeal.163 The
rationale behind this notion is that “[a] voluntary and intelligent plea of
guilty by an accused is . . . a waiver of all defenses other than those
jurisdictional . . . . Where a conviction is rendered upon such a plea and the
punishment fixed by law is in fact imposed in a proceeding free of
jurisdictional defect, there is nothing to appeal.”164 Most states treat Alford
pleas the same as guilty pleas,165 which limits the ability of defendants who
enter Alford pleas in those states to appeal their cases on the merits.
ii. Postconviction Remedies
While the benefits discussed above might look appealing to defendants
and their attorneys, it is essential that both groups understand the harsh
160
See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 203–04 (1995); Tollett v.
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v. Commonwealth, 391 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1990)), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 414 S.E.2d 440
(1992) (mem.); see also Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267 (holding that when defendant has admitted
in open court that he is guilty of the offense charged, he may not thereafter raise independent
claims regarding deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to entry of guilty
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ramifications that Alford pleas have on the available postconviction
remedies for innocent defendants. As previously stated, most states treat
Alford pleas the same as guilty pleas when it comes to postconviction
remedies.166 And many states do not allow a defendant who entered a
guilty plea or an Alford plea to seek postconviction DNA testing, for
example.167 Moreover, even if a state does not explicitly preclude someone
who entered an Alford plea or a guilty plea from seeking postconviction
relief, a judge may be more skeptical when evaluating an actual innocence
claim from someone who has pleaded guilty, even if that person has
maintained his innocence.
Therefore, if any new DNA evidence is found in the case of the West
Memphis Three, for example, the defendants cannot use this newly
discovered evidence to seek a new trial or a full exoneration by a judge.
Rather, after the West Memphis Three entered their Alford pleas,
prosecutors “declar[ed] the case closed.”168 This also has ramifications for
the victims’ families. Assuming that the West Memphis Three are in fact
innocent, as so many have to come to believe, the true perpetrator(s) of the
crime will likely never be brought to justice. No more public investigations
will be done and no new leads will be explored. Echols, Baldwin, and
Misskelley will remain the convicted killers of Christopher Byers, Michael
Moore, and Steven Branch unless the Governor of Arkansas grants them
clemency. As previously mentioned, the West Memphis Three’s cases are
procedurally unique because their Alford pleas were entered years after
their convictions as a means of securing release for the defendants.
However, while the West Memphis Three are currently out of prison, they
are not fully exonerated in a legal sense.
Regarding the case of Robert Davis, under Virginia Code § 19.2327.2, a defendant who has pleaded “not guilty” and who has acquired
newly discovered evidence not reasonably known to him at the time of trial
could seek relief upon a claim of actual innocence.169 However, Virginia
treats Alford pleas as identical to guilty pleas when it comes to the available
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postconviction remedies for defendants who enter this plea. Therefore,
Davis cannot seek relief upon a claim of actual innocence. His only chance
for relief rests in the clemency process and is consequently solely in the
hands of Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell.170 Given Virginia’s track
record with clemency, as exemplified by the “Norfolk Four” case,171
Davis’s path to freedom will be very difficult.
Generally speaking, the clemency process is a bit of a mystery to legal
scholars, as “[s]urprisingly little is known about how clemency is used in
practice.”172 In fact, very few states have developed clear statutory or
administrative guidelines that pertain to the clemency process,173 leading to
the view that the clemency process is “arbitrary” and a “flawed vehicle for
achieving justice.”174 Davis’s likelihood of receiving clemency looks even
bleaker given the data surrounding executive pardons at the state level.175
The number of state pardons has fallen in recent decades, with most states
averaging fewer than one hundred commutations per state between 1995
and 2003.176 As mentioned above, the arbitrary nature of the clemency
process stems in part from the inherent political nature of the process.
Many politicians “remain afraid of soft-on-crime accusations . . . should an
individual on the receiving end of a pardon or commutation go on to
commit another crime.”177 A real-world example of clemency’s effect on
politics came in the 2008 Republican presidential primary when a television
advertisement for Mitt Romney stated:
Two good men. But who is ready to make tough decisions? Mike Huckabee? Soft
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U. L. REV. 567, 567 (2000).
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on government spending. He grew a $6 billion government into a $16 billion
government. Backed in-state tuition benefits for illegals, and granted 1,033 pardons
and commutations, including 12 murderers. His foreign policy? “Ludicrous,” says
Condoleezza Rice. Mitt Romney held spending down below inflation. Cut taxes.
178
Zero pardons. The difference? Strong leadership.

Given the trends regarding clemency and the possible negative political
ramifications, it is no wonder that Obama has granted clemency on fewer
occasions than any modern president, pardoning just 22 individuals while
denying 1,019 petitions.179
iii. Collateral Estoppel (Civil Suits)
Another negative ramification of entering an Alford plea is that a
defendant’s Alford plea “generally forecloses him from relitigating the
issue of his guilt in subsequent civil cases arising from the same
facts . . . .”180 In contrast to a nolo contendere plea, in which collateral
estoppel will not apply because the defendant accepted punishment without
charges being litigated or determined, an Alford plea has been properly
pleaded and determined.181 As discussed above, the limitations on
postconviction remedies make exoneration difficult for defendants who
enter Alford pleas, thus making civil suits extraordinarily unlikely in these
cases.
The West Memphis Three and Robert Davis are now precluded from
bringing civil suits against the government. In fact, prosecutors in the West
Memphis Three case, when discussing why they decided to enter into the
plea agreements actually cited the concern that if the men were exonerated
at trial they could potentially sue the state for millions.182
Furthermore, twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have
laws that allow exonerated defendants who have proven their actual
innocence to recover money from the state automatically.183 Virginia,
where Robert Davis’s case is set, has a statute in place that would have
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allowed Davis to file a petition for a certificate of innocence and receive
compensation from the state.184 Conversely, the West Memphis Three
would not have been able to petition for a writ of actual innocence—even if
they had been exonerated—because Arkansas does not have a state
compensation law in place.185
iv. Effects on Sentencing and Parole Decisions
“Sentencing, probation, and parole decisions often hinge on whether a
transgressor accepts responsibility and expresses contrition for his
crimes.”186 In fact, when issuing a sentence, a court can actually view
expressions of remorse as evidence that the lawbreaker is less deserving of
harsh punishment and less likely to reoffend.187 Five states specifically
address remorse as a mitigating factor,188 and other states actually view lack
of remorse as an aggravating factor at sentencing.189 Defendants who enter
Alford pleas by definition do not show remorse because the pleas revolve
around defendants’ assertions of innocence. Courts across the country have
nonetheless refused to exempt defendants who enter Alford pleas from an
assessment of remorse during their sentencing. For example, courts in
Georgia, Idaho, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin all treat Alford
defendants the same as those who plead guilty or not guilty during the
sentencing phase of the trial.190 By the very nature of the plea, a defendant
184

See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11 (2008) (providing that if his conviction has been
vacated, a wrongfully convicted person is entitled to 90% of the Virginia per capita personal
income for up to 20 years, plus a tuition award worth $10,000 in the Virginia community
college system).
185
See Compensation for the Wrongly Convicted, supra note 183.
186
See Peg Schultz, The Alford Plea in Juvenile Court, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 187, 192
(2006).
187
See Bryan H. Ward, A Plea Best Not Taken: Why Criminal Defendants Should Avoid
the Alford Plea, 68 MO. L. REV. 913, 921 (2003).
188
Id. at 921 n.43 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(k)(2) (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.0026(2)(J) (West 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(e)(11), (15) (2001); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 982(B) (West Supp. 2003); R.I. CT. RULES ANN. SUPER. CT. SENT’G
BENCHMARKS 1(i) (2002)). For case law indicating the appropriateness of considering
remorse as a mitigating factor at sentencing, see, e.g., State v. McKinney, 946 P.2d 456, 458
(Alaska Ct. App. 1997); Commonwealth v. Mills, 764 N.E.2d 854, 866 n.9 (Mass. App. Ct.
2002); State v. Buttrey, 756 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).
189
See Ward, supra note 187, at 922 n.44 (noting that Ohio is the only state that
statutorily defines “lack of remorse” as an aggravating factor at sentencing); see also OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12(D)(5) (West 2006).
190
See, e.g., Clark v. State, 366 S.E.2d 361 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Howry, 896
P.2d 1002 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995); State v. Philpot, No. M2000-01999-CCA-R3-CD, 2001
WL 473842 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 2, 2001); Smith v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 11 (Va.
Ct. App. 1998); State v. Westcott, No. 97-0419-CR, 1998 WL 692827 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 7,

2013]

ALFORD PLEAS AND INNOCENCE

305

who has entered an Alford plea has failed to show remorse because he is
professing his innocence.
Moreover, expressions of innocence in front of a parole board will
most likely have a deleterious effect on the prisoner’s chance of getting
paroled.191 For example, Daniel Medwed found that “surveying state parole
release decisions demonstrates that a prisoner’s willingness to ‘own up’ to
his misdeeds—to acknowledge culpability and express remorse for the
crime for which he is currently incarcerated—is a vital part of the parole
decision-making calculus.”192
v. Alford Pleas Undermine the Credibility of the Justice System
Accepting a plea of guilty from someone who maintains his innocence
undermines the credibility of the justice system.193 The criminal justice
system is designed to punish only those who are morally blameworthy, and,
therefore, the conviction of an innocent defendant threatens the very
foundation of our system of justice.194 This critique of the Alford plea came
to the fore in the case of the West Memphis Three. The State entered into
this plea agreement and agreed to the release of these three men from prison
even though the State still maintained that the West Memphis Three were
guilty.195 Dan Stidham, Jessie Misskelley’s former attorney and current
Arkansas State District Court Judge, reflected on the plea agreement,
stating, “[w]hile this Alford plea allowed justice to happen, there’s no honor
in it.”196 Stidham faults the state of Arkansas for taking eighteen years to
“correct [its] mistake,” and notes that when it finally did, it did so “in a
cowardly fashion with no honor.”197 Stidham, one of Jessie Misskelley’s
closest confidants—a man who spent eighteen years fighting for Jessie’s
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freedom—is “happy [Misskelley and the others are free],” but he would
“rather have won the case in the courtroom.”198
In the same vein, the use of the Alford plea can also cause the public to
lose confidence in the criminal justice system because “[t]he public may not
understand how a party can proclaim innocence in a courtroom, yet be
convicted on a guilty plea.”199 People may fear that there is inherent
corruption in a system that seems to place little importance on seeking truth
or justice.200 The West Memphis Three case exemplifies this potential
effect of the Alford plea; many members of the public may have wondered
why these men were set free even though they were still considered guilty
by the state of Arkansas. People who believe in the men’s guilt expressed
outrage that these so-called child murderers were being set free201 while
people who believe in their innocence expressed outrage that they were not
being exonerated.202 For many citizens, the use of the Alford plea in this
case and in general made “the coercion and injustice [of the criminal justice
system] too obvious to deny.”203
Conversely, it could be argued that Alford pleas actually benefit the
criminal justice system, rather than undermine it, because they shed light on
potential misconduct within the system. For example, in accepting Alford
pleas from the West Memphis Three, prosecutors may have actually caused
the public to lose more confidence in the State, rather than to lose
confidence in the innocence of the defendants. Maybe allowing, or even
encouraging, Alford pleas will have the somewhat perverse result of
actually strengthening the justice system by highlighting its inherent flaws
and inefficiencies to a public that cannot understand why our system would
allow an innocent person to plead guilty.
Inherent in this overall point on justice is the tragic injustice done to
the innocent defendant who enters an Alford plea and goes to prison for a
crime he did not commit. This potential result requires all participants in
the justice system—judges, lawyers, and defendants—to examine critically
a system that would let a person who actively professes innocence plead
guilty. In this Comment, I have discussed some of the pros and cons of
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allowing and encouraging this type of plea, but at the heart of the matter
rests one of the underlying principles of our criminal justice system: “it is
better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”204
V. CONCLUSION
When determining how best to advise their clients, attorneys must
carefully balance the consequences of their innocent clients pleading not
guilty—and the related prospects of a risky trial and a possible higher
sentence—against the negative postconviction consequences of entering an
Alford plea. Ten years ago, innocent defendants who had confessed might
have been reluctant to plead “not guilty”—and with good reason—given the
persuasive power confessions had over juries. However, the Innocence
Movement has changed the way society views confessions that lack
corroborating evidence. The mainstream media has latched onto this issue
and disseminated information about DNA exonerations and false
confessions to the public. People are finally starting to understand how
someone could confess to a crime he did not commit. It is in this context
that defendants and attorneys must now analyze their plea-bargaining
strategies.
There are many avenues by which defense attorneys can persuade
juries that—in this age of innocence—a defendant who has confessed is in
fact innocent. The smartest strategy for a defense attorney would be to get
the confession thrown out pretrial based on voluntariness. Some scholars
have argued that judges should also take into consideration the reliability of
the confession during the suppression hearing by examining factors such as:
1) [W]hether the confession contains nonpublic information that can be independently
verified, would only be known by the true perpetrator or an accomplice, and cannot
likely be guessed by chance; 2) whether the suspect’s confession led the police to new
evidence about the crime; and 3) whether the suspect’s postadmission narrative “fits”
205
(or fails to fit) with the crime facts and existing objective evidence.

Another option would be for defense counsel to call an expert on false
confessions to testify during the trial. Dan Stidham actually employed this
technique during Jessie Misskelley’s trial; he called Richard Ofshe, an
expert on false confessions, to testify to jurors about why Misskelley’s
statement was likely coerced. However, Dr. Ofshe was not permitted to
testify to his opinion that the confession was involuntary because such
testimony would contradict the judge’s previous ruling that Misskelley’s
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confession was voluntary.206
Cases such as those of Robert Davis and the West Memphis Three
contained unique circumstances that affected the attorneys’ plea-bargaining
decisions. However, these cases, and cases featuring false confessions in
general, shed light on the harmful effects of an innocent defendant pleading
guilty. The West Memphis Three will never get to contest their innocence
in court; they will remain convicted felons and carry this label with them on
every job interview, every loan application, and every media appearance.
Moreover, Robert Davis sits in prison; his only hope of freedom lies in the
volatile clemency process. While this Comment argues that lawyers who
represent an innocent defendant should not counsel their client to enter this
plea in a case where a confession is the sole piece of evidence, the difficulty
and enormity of this decision must be acknowledged. Although the
Innocence Movement has educated many people on the reality of false
confessions, there is a real possibility that if Robert Davis or Jessie
Misskelley were on trial today solely on the basis on their confessions, a
jury could find them guilty. How do you tell your client that you are
essentially rolling the dice with his life because you think you can convince
a jury that his confession is false? As has been discussed in this Comment,
the better bet for most lawyers who represent clients in these types of cases
is to enter a plea of not guilty and allow the case to play out in the system,
rather than enter an Alford plea and potentially limit a client’s
postconviction remedies. However, there is no guarantee that justice will
be done for an innocent defendant who enters a plea of not guilty.
A better solution could lie in the judicial system itself. Maybe judges
should refrain from accepting such pleas when the evidence of guilt is based
solely on a confession, instead of leaving this important decision up to an
attorney. Or maybe as educated citizens, we should place more political
pressure on prosecutors to refrain from bringing a case against a defendant
based solely on a confession that exhibits classic signs of coercion and
contamination. No matter the solution, one thing is clear: it is an utter
travesty for our justice system to allow innocent defendants to sit in prison
or to fail to give a defendant who has been released on an Alford plea the
ability to clear his name.
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